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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, global foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows increased from approximately $200 billion to $1.5 trillion.' During that
same period, the scope of the legal protections accorded to foreign investments
has grown at an equally extraordinary rate.2 Today, international investment law
consists of almost 2,600 treaties among approximately 180 countries.3 The
system of law codifies the obligations that States owe to private investors and
gives investors a direct right of action against host governments for breaches of
those obligations.4
Unlike other areas of international law, where many obligations are
perceived as aspirational5 and where the prospect of enforcement varies,
international investment law imposes concrete obligations on the participating
States. Enforcement is neither limited to diplomatic or economic sanctions nor
tempered by the political sensitivities of the day. Rather, the law is enforced by
private actors and imposes the very real threat of forcing governments to defend
their sovereign actions before an international arbitral tribunal.
Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, at xxvii-xxviii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa
E. Sachs eds., 2009).
2 See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 1 (2005) (stating that, in the past forty years, 2,200 bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) involving 176 countries have come into existence).
3 Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 1, at xxxiv.
4 See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-2 (explaining historical problem of sovereign
immunity and the positive effect of States increasing consent to arbitrate as manifested in BITs
and private agreements).
' See, e.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affid
in part, vacated in part sub nom. Khulmani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d
Cir. 2007), affidfor lack of quorum sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424
(2008) (stating that the Universal Declaration "simply do[es] not create binding international law"
and that its "broad aspirational language" does "not meet the specificity require[ment]" of the Alien
Tort Claims Act); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("[I]n the absence of any generally applicable procedures of compulsory
jurisdiction, the settlement of international claims is often left to diplomatic negotiation rather than
being submitted to judicial settlement .... Although in international law a state has a right to
submit an international claim against another state in respect of injuries suffered by one of the
claimant state's nationals, it has in international law no duty to do so."); Jutta Brunnde & Stephen
J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of
International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 19,22-23,44-47, 54-55 (2000) (discussing the
aspirational nature of international law).
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It has been assumed that formal acceptance of international investment
law-through a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty-was a precondition
to foreign investment in many developing States.6 Individual governments
historically have balanced their need for foreign investment against the potential
limits that international investment law might impose on them. To the extent the
need for foreign investment outweighed concerns over potential limits on, or
liability for, sovereign action, States generally elected to enter into bilateral or
regional investment treaties with the expectation that foreign investment would
follow. Studies, however, have questioned the relationship between investment
treaties and foreign investment.7 At the same time, some government officials
and scholars have argued that the scope of international investment law has been
expanded beyond the participating States' original intent. Thus, while the vast
majority of participants in the international investment law system abide by their
obligations, a number of States have begun to recalculate the costs and benefits
of international investment law. Some States, like the United States, have tried
to clarify the limits of international investment law through the adoption of new,
more balanced investment treaties. Others, mainly in Latin America, have
overtly repudiated the system or, at least, have expressly questioned whether
continued participation in the system is in their long-term interest.
In light of the compliance costs associated with international investment law
and the challenges to the system evidenced by a number of States, it is important
to understand why States accept, adhere to, breach, or repudiate the system. To
better understand that issue, Part 1I of this Article discusses the historical
6 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'LL. 639, 669-70 (1998) (noting that
developing countries are better able to compete for foreign investment by signing a BIT because
it increases the credibility of their commitments).
7 See, e.g., Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact ofBilateralInvestment Treaties
on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004) (finding that positive impact of
BITs manifests upon execution and increases upon implementation of treaty); Jeswald W.
Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation ofBilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 90 (2005) (examining success of
BITs in achieving goals of investment protection and promotion, finding some positive effect);
Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of
(International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW& Soc'Y REv. 805
(2008) (finding no direct correlation between investment decisions and increased legal protection
of international arbitration guarantees in treaties); Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact
of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Yale Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol'y, Research
Paper No. 293, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-557121 (asserting that BITs do not
encourage investment in countries whose economic climates are risky, though they may
positively impact investment in already-attractive countries).
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evolution of international investment law. Part I explores alternative theories
for why States have bound themselves to international investment law and the
varied expectations of the constituencies served by the system. Finally, Part IV
explores various factors that influence a State to comply with, breach, or
repudiate international investment law in an effort to understand the relative
importance of those factors in the compliance calculus.
II. THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
International law is a "construct of norms, standards, principles, institutions
and procedures" that serve the purposes of the international community.' It is
designed to "establish and maintain order and enhance reliable expectations, to
protect 'persons,' their property and other interests, [and] to further other
values." Historically, the "persons" subject to international law were not
natural persons, but States. ° As such, the rights and obligations imposed by
international law typically run from State-to-State, and could be enforced only
by States.
International investment law fundamentally differs from traditional or
customary forms of international law in several respects. First, unlike customary
international law, international investment law does not principally derive its
authority from the measure of "consistent State practice" and opinio juris.
Rather, while customary international law is relevant to the interpretation of
international investment law's substantive obligations, the willingness of States
to follow international investment law is reflected in the approximately 2,600
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and several multilateral investment treaties
currently in force." Such uniformity of consent is rare within the international
community and has been characterized as one of the "more remarkable
developments in international law in the past 40 years. 12
Second, the substantive protections found in international investment law are
directed towards private actors. Thus, while States are the formal parties to
8 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES
COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1989).
9Id.
1" See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 INT'L
LEGAL THEORY 9, 10 (2005) ("[I]nternational law exists to order a community in which States
are the members.").
" See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 LAW &
Bus. REV. AM. 155, 165-66 (2007) (discussing impact of international custom on creation of
BITs and of BITs on development of international custom).
12 BISHOP ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
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investment treaties, private investors are the principal beneficiaries of the
system. By signing investment treaties, States commit to treat foreign investors
in accordance with the substantive protections set forth therein. As a "third-
party beneficiary," however, investment treaties (and, indeed, international
investment law as a whole) do not impose reciprocal obligations on foreign
investors."
Third, international investment law provides investors the ability to directly
prosecute their own claims against a host government through international
arbitration. Investors are no longer forced to choose between litigating
investment-related claims in the courts of a host State or seeking diplomatic
protection from their home governments. International investment law,
therefore, has greatly depoliticized the dispute-resolution process by placing the
enforcement decision entirely within the hands of the investor.
The modem form of international investment law can be traced to the post-
World War II reconstruction era.'4 The system was proposed as a means of
substituting private investment into developing States as the bulk of sovereign
aid began to wane. The countries-that needed private investment the most,
however, typically posed the highest investment risks. Frequently, such
countries did not have adequate means of protecting property rights, either
because their legal systems did not recognize such rights or because their
judiciaries were either incapable or unwilling to enforce them. 5 Critical to the
development of the international investment law system, therefore, was the
creation of two elements: international protections that could supplant the
seemingly inadequate domestic regimes of many target States, and adequate
incentives that would persuade States to provide foreign investors with higher
standards of property rights than were otherwise available in their domestic laws.
3 The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has prepared a model
investment agreement that would impose social obligations on foreign investors. For a copy of
the model agreement, see Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., IISD Model International Agreement
on Investment for Sustainable Development (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2005/investmentmodel intagreement.pdf.
" See id. at 4 (stating that "[elfforts to organize both international protection for foreign
investment and methods for resolving disputes began in earnest after World War II").
15 Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 1960-2000,2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 265,277 (2008) ("[G]overnments with little inherent
credibility are more likely to sign BITs than are governments known for their fair treatment of
foreign capital.").
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A. The Pre-BIT Era
Prior to the modem BIT era, international investment law was predicated
largely on customary international law and its contours had not developed very
far. Although foreign investments had played a prominent role in international
affairs for centuries, the legal protections accorded such investments were
extremely slow in developing. The difficulty in creating a universal system of
international investment law was predicated largely on three factors.
First, the international community was "divided over what law governed the
treatment of foreign investment."' 6 Historically, developed States had accepted
international law's role in governing the treatment of foreign nationals and thus
readily accepted that international law should also regulate their treatment of
foreign investments. 7 Developing States, by contrast, traditionally had fought
against the expansion of international law into areas that they considered to be
solely within their domestic purview.'" Indeed, throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
developing States waged a sustained campaign against creating a higher standard
of protection for foreign investors and sought to retain absolute sovereignty over
their own natural resources, including the right to regulate those resources as
they saw fit and the exclusive right to adjudge claims brought by companies
benefiting from those resources. 9
The campaign was fought on both the domestic and international fronts. On
the domestic front, many States took measures to solidify their control over
foreign investments. For example, a number of Latin American countries
adopted the position articulated by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo and enacted
measures intended to codify the equality of domestic and foreign investors and
prohibit foreign investors from claiming rights and remedies that were more
extensive than those available to domestic investors." Some countries even
incorporated such provisions into their constitutions."
16 Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary
International Law, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 27, 27 (2004).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 27-28. This campaign led the U.S. Supreme Court to observe in 1964 that "there
are few issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the
limitations on a State's power to expropriate the property of aliens." Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
20 See, e.g., Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. CoMP. L. 123, 127 (2007) (noting that
Latin American countries inserted "Calvo Clauses" into constitutions, domestic legislation,
international treaties, and contracts in order to protect domestic investors from special privileges
for foreign investors).
21 See id. at 127-28 (quoting Constituci6n Politica de la Repiiblica del Peril [1933
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On the international front, the emerging socialist States of Eastern Europe
and the newly developed States that were formed after the post-World War II
collapse of colonialism adamantly sought to establish their economic
independence and to insulate themselves from the reaches of international law.22
The international efforts reached their pinnacle with the passage of the 1962
United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, which, in case of nationalizations, purported to allow
individual States to determine the amount of "appropriate compensation, in
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law." '23 A decade
later, the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
issued a resolution reiterating the sovereign right of States to nationalize
companies to "recover their natural resources" and affirming the sole right of the
States to adjudicate disputes relating to such actions.24 However, because neither
the General Assembly nor the UNCTAD resolution carried any force of law,
they were largely seen as aspirational in nature.
By the mid 1970s, the momentum behind the international campaign waned.
In 1974, the United Nations passed the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, which purported to give every state the right to (i) "freely exercise full
permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its
wealth, natural resources, and economic activities," (ii) "nationalize, expropriate
or transfer ownership of foreign property," and (iii) settle questions of
compensation "under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals."25 Despite the seemingly concrete terms set forth in the Charter, the
document was adopted without the support of a single developed State.26 Since
Constitution] art. 31, which implemented Calvo Doctrine in Peru).
22 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOCI, Comm'n on Transnat'l Corps., Work on the
Formulation of the United Nations Code of Conduct of Transnational Corporations:
Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporation, 43-48, U.N.
Doc. E/C.10/1985/S/2 (May 22, 1985).
23 G.A. Res. 1803, 4, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14,
1962).
24 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD] Res. 88(XII), 2 U.N. TDBOR, 12th Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/423 (Oct. 19, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1475 (1972).
25 G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(Dec. 12, 1974).
26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
reporters' notes 1 (1987) (stating that "[tihe Charter was adopted 120 in favor, 6 against, and 10
abstentions, the vote reflecting the views of the majority as developing States, with the United
States among the dissenters and the other developed Western States either dissenting or
abstaining").
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the Charter had no legal force on its own, the failure of a single developed State
to support it confirmed the lack of defined customary international law standards
and only served to highlight the disagreement between developed and
developing States.27 The gap between these divergent perspectives would have
to be bridged before a modem system of international investment law could be
developed.
Second, the difficulty in creating a universal agreement on international
investment law was exacerbated by the fact that the international community
could not agree on the content of the law governing foreign investments.
Although many Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties generally
referenced property rights and prohibitions against uncompensated
expropriation, the specific protections they accorded the property of foreign
aliens were ill defined and were largely predicated on customary international
law.2" As a result, it was believed that such standards were incapable of
adequately protecting foreign investors or providing States with certainty as to
the scope of their obligations.29 To the extent that articulable standards had
developed, there was significant disagreement as to their applicability. For
example, one of the earliest protections provided to foreign investors was the
prohibition against uncompensated expropriation. While the notion that some
compensation must be paid was beyond doubt, significant disagreement existed
over the standard ofcompensation. Customary international law simply required
expropriating States to provide full compensation.30 The United States defined
the term "full" compensation to mean "prompt, adequate, and effective"
compensation.3' Known as the Hull Formula, this standard was widely adopted
by developed States and became synonymous with the idea of full
compensation.32
27 Id.
2 See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman& Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation
in the BIT Generation, in 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 116 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2003)
(noting that "the prototypical FCN treaty did little more than impose upon the host State an
obligation not to expropriate covered foreign investments without paying compensation for them").
29 For example, there was significant concern that customary law standards "failed to take
account of contemporary investment practices and to address important issues of investor
concern, such as their rights to make monetary transfers from the host country." Salacuse, supra
note ll,at 155.
30 Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (The Merits) (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 17, at 27-28 (Sept. 13, 1928).
31 3 GREEN H. HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 658-59 (1942).
32 See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Rep. 113, 369 1497
(final award of Mar. 14, 2003) (UNCITRAL), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
CME-2003-Final_002.pdf.
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Developing States vehemently opposed the Hull Formula on the grounds that
it impermissibly infringed on their sovereign authority.33 The United Nations
attempted to mediate the dispute by passing General Assembly Resolution 3 171,
which declared that a State expropriating foreign property "is entitled to
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment,
and.., any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the
national legislation of [that] State."34 As with the Charter of Economic Rights
and the Permanent Resolution on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, General
Assembly Resolution 3171 had little practical affect. While arbitral tribunals
subsequently spoke in terms of "just,"" "appropriate, ' 36 or "equitable" 37
compensation, those terms were little more than euphemisms for the Hull
Formula.3
Third, there was little evidence of the tangible benefit developing States
would receive by adopting a formal system of international investment law. The
33 See, e.g., Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 259,318 (1994)
(asserting that "[mlost Third World States oppose such high standards of valuation, and instead
argue for 'appropriate compensation... taking into account ... all circumstances that the State
considers pertinent' ").
14 G.A. Res. 3171, 52, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 17,
1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238, 239 (1974).
3' Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libya, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1, 79 (1981)
(arbitration award of Apr. 12, 1977) (Mahmassani, sole arbitrator) (deeming the award to be
"just and equitable compensation").
36 See, e.g., American Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL) v. Kuwait, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 976, 1033, 144 (1982) (final arbitration award of Mar. 24, 1982) (finding that the
claimant was entitled only to "appropriate" compensation following the lawful expropriation of
its investment by the Kuwait government); Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi v. Iran, 30 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 170, 88 (final arbitration award of Oct. 12, 1994) ("The gradual emergence of this
rule aims at ensuring that the amount of compensation is determined in a flexible manner...
taking into account the specific circumstances of each case. The prevalence of the 'appropriate'
compensation standard does not imply, however, that the compensation quantum should be
always 'less than full'....").
31 LIAMCO, 20 I.L.M. at 76-77 ("[Ilt would be reasonable and just to adopt the formula of
'equitable compensation' as a measure for the estimation of damages in the present dispute. This
formulation is certainly in complete harmony with the general trend of international theory and
practice on the concepts of sovereignty.").
38 Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi, 30 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 170 88 (effectively restating the
Hull Formula in holding "while international law undoubtedly sets forth an obligation to provide
compensation for property taken, international law theory and practice do not support the
conclusion that the 'prompt, adequate and effective' standard represents the prevailing standard
of compensation... [r]ather, customary international law favors an 'appropriate' compensation
standard").
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stated goal was to foster private foreign direct investment in developing States.
Private investment lagged dramatically behind sovereign aid, however, and it
was unclear whether the business community could or would generate sufficient
investment to materially affect a country's development. At the same time,
many developing States were wary of any encroachment on their sovereign
authority.
In the face of these three factors, it is hardly surprising that international
investment law's development was stymied during the pre-BIT era.
B. The BIT Era
While the international community could not agree on an overarching
paradigm for international investment law, individual States began exploring the
potential benefits of bilateral investment relationships.39 The first BIT was
signed in 1959 by Germany and Pakistan.4' Since that time, over 180 countries
entered into more than 2,500 investment treaties, approximately 75% of which
have entered into force.4 These treaties are "truly universal in their reach and
essential provisions,' ' 2 and have "become an integral part of international
relations." '43
Investment treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, establish the standards
that governments commit to apply to foreign investments." The vast majority
of BITs provide investors broad protections against uncompensated
expropriation, discriminatory treatment, the inequitable or arbitrary application
of the law, and the right to convert local currencies and repatriate profits.45
9 See Schwebel, supra note 16, at 28.
40 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 24
U.N.T.S. 1963.
41 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], The Entry into Force of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), at 2, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9, published in 114
Monitor No. 3 (Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf.
42 CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Rep. 113,369 497 (final
award of Mar. 14, 2003) (UNCITRAL), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-
2003-Final_002.pdf.
43 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of
Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 327 (1994).
4 See Schwebel, supra note 16, at 27 (noting that "[c]ustomary international law ...
embod[ies] the principles... found in more than two thousand concordant [BITs]).
4' Historically, the major differences among BITs centered around three areas: (a) the types
of activities that constituted an investment; (b) when a venture qualified as an "investment" and,
therefore, fell within the protections of the treaties; and (c) whether the treaties applied to
investments that were made prior to the entry into force of the treaty. See Tobin & Rose-
[Vol. 38:63
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In addition, investment treaties almost universally give investors the right to
submit disputes to international arbitration. This is arguably the most significant
right given by investment treaties. Under traditional international law,
individuals and corporations did not have standing to bring claims directly
against foreign governments.' Aside from bringing suit in the domestic courts
of the host State (a thoroughly disfavored option), the only recourse available to
investors was to request that their home government take up their cause and
espouse their claim through either diplomatic negotiations or formal suit at the
International Court of Justice.47 Espousal is equally disfavored by investors
because of the political obstacles and loss of control involved." Indeed, the
decision to espouse a claim is entirely discretionary. Moreover, before a
government can espouse a claim on behalf of one of its nationals, the national
must have exhausted its local remedies. Thus, as a precondition to espousal the
foreign investor must litigate against the host government in its domestic courts
unless the investor can show that there is no reasonable prospect of obtaining an
effective remedy in the host State's courts.49 Finally, if the investor's home
government elects to espouse its claim, the investor is required to cede all
Ackerman, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining that BITs are intended to "secure the legal environment
for foreign investors").
46 See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich et al., Recent Developments in State Responsibility, 83 AM.
Soc'YINT'LL. PROC. 224,244-46 (1989) (discussing the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as evidence
of how the concept of State responsibility has broadened).
47 See id. at 245 (discussing the historical impossibility of individual actions against
sovereign powers).
48 See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on
Cts. and Admin. Prac. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 83-84 (1996) (testimony
of Abraham D. Sofaer, former Legal Advisor to U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that "the
Department [of State]'s decision with respect to espousal is likely to be influenced, not only by
the merits of the case, but by the Department's concern for offending a foreign State and creating
a potential irritant in its dealings with that State"); David J. Bederman, International Law
Advocacy and Its Discontents, 2 CIl. J. INT'L L. 475,484 (2001) ("Individual grievances have
tended to be subordinated to the greater good of the nation in its pursuit of common foreign
policy objectives."); see also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 160-62 (1992) (stating that "the government may be reluctant to espouse
because of a fear that the investment dispute could damages [sic] its relations with the
expropriating country and interfere with other foreign policy objectives").
49 See Michael Matheson, The Fifty-Eighth Session of the International Law Commission, 101
AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 419 (2007) (citing Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of
Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities: General Commentary, para. 12, in
Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-Eight Session, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 110, 113, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006)).
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control over that claim. The government is free to settle or abandon the claim
as it sees fit.
InI. WHY STATES ENTER INTo BILATERAL INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIPS
The impetus driving developed States to seek out bilateral investment
relationships is understandable. Such relationships allow them to selectively
choose which countries they grant investment protections, thereby establishing
a measure of political, diplomatic, and economic leverage, while at the same
time creating mechanisms for protecting their nationals' foreign investments
against adverse government action.5  In addition, developed countries, in
particular the United States, viewed bilateral relationships as a means of
fostering increased property protections around the world.51 The United States
Trade Representative's office commented that the three goals of the U.S. BIT
program were to "1) protect U.S. investment abroad... ; 2) encourage adoption
in foreign countries of market-oriented domestic policies that treat private
investment fairly; and 3) support the development of international law standards
consistent with these objectives."5 2
The motivation for developing States to enter into such bilateral relationships
is often harder to discern. Investment treaties are effectively contracts that
obligate governments to treat foreign investments according to international
standards. Like contracting parties, States that enter into BITs do so with clear
expectations as to the attendant costs and benefits.
As noted, developing States objected to an overarching paradigm for
international investment law because the costs were too high; in particular, the
system was seen as an unacceptable intrusion on sovereign authority and the
standards were vague and ill-defined. 3 In spite of those objections, developing
States began entering into bilateral treaties that contained far greater investor
" See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their
Origin, Purposes and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 105, 105 (1986)
(noting that the United States created the U.S. BIT program as a "mechanism for protecting U.S.
foreign investment in the Third World from unfair or discriminatory treatment").
"' Id. (noting that the U.S. viewed the system as a means of"promoting treatment standards
compatible with U.S. policies and principles of international law");see also Salacuse & Sullivan,
supra note 7, at 76 ("In addition to protecting the investments of their nationals, some countries,
especially the United States, have had another objective in negotiating BITs: to facilitate the
entry and operation of these investments by inducing host countries to remove various
impediments in their regulatory systems. They have sought to encourage or induce investment
and market liberalization within their negotiating partners.").
52 Jeffirey Lang, Keynote Address, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 457 (1998).
s' See supra Part I.
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protections than the multilateral treaties that had been rejected. For example,
most BITs between developed and developing States formally incorporate the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation standard that was rejected by
General Assembly Resolution 3171."4 In addition, BITs typically require host
States to provide "fair and equitable" treatment, "full protection and security,"
and adhere to a "minimum standard of treatment."55 The general nature of those
terms has led to varied and, occasionally, inconsistent interpretations by arbitral
tribunals. Finally, a number of BTs contain "umbrella clauses," which require
States to adhere to their obligations and thus arguably elevate mere contractual
breaches to breaches of international law that, in turn, may give rise to an
investor-State dispute.56
In light of the broad protections found in most BITs and the objections that
developing States raised against granting such protections, it is important to
understand why developing States would enter into bilateral investment
relationships. Reasons vary; however, explanations typically fall into two
categories: the "positive correlation theory" and the "coercion theory."
A. A Perceived Correlation Between BITs and Foreign Direct Investment
One reason why developing States began entering into bilateral relationships
is that they believed a direct relationship existed between signing a BIT and
increased foreign direct investment. As stated, the countries that need foreign
investment the most often provide the least amount of property rights
protections. It was perceived, therefore, that foreign investors would be
unwilling to risk their capital in a country that did not have well-defined
protections for property, either because such rights were not recognized or the
country's judicial infrastructure was incapable or unwilling to enforce those
rights. 5
7
4 See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States and the Government
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 5(5)
[hereinafter Model BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf
(implementing standard language quoted above).
55 Id. art. 5(1), (2).
56 Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of
Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in
Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASONL. REV. 135, 142-43 (2006); Emmanuel Gaillard,
Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Broad Dispute Resolution Clauses, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 6, 2005, at 3,
col. 1.
" See, e.g., Elkins et al., supra note 15, at 277 (stating that "[g]overnments with little
inherent credibility are more likely to sign BITs than are governments known for their fair
treatment of foreign capital"); Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 5 (finding that
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A BIT was supposed to offset that risk factor by allowing States to publicly
commit to treat foreign investments according to international standards." From
an investor's perspective, BITs were supposed to increase the credibility of a
State's commitment by "reducing the ambiguity of the host government's
obligations," including the "investor's government as a treaty party," and
providing for a direct right of action.59 Thus, by entering into BITs it was
thought that developing States could mitigate systemic deficiencies in their legal
systems that increase the perceived risk of investing in that State,6° and in doing
so, increase their standing in the international community.6 '
In light of this belief, many developing States felt they faced a Hobson's
choice-either accept international investment law and reap the benefits of
increased investment that were supposed to come with it, or reject the system
and be placed at a competitive disadvantage with other countries vying for a
limited pool of foreign investment. As a result, while developing States publicly
reeled against the perceived diminution of sovereign authority that accompanied
the acceptance of international investment law, a great number of them elected
to embrace the system in the hope that the increased foreign investment would
offset any concerns about the potential loss of sovereignty. As explained by a
former judge on the Court of Appeals of Sri Lanka "developing countries, beset
developing countries frequently "cannot make credible commitments not to violate their own
country's rules").
58 Professor Andrew Guzman states that BITs help developing countries overcome the
problem of"dynamic inconsistency," whereby they would like to assure investors of their respect
for property rights and their willingness to provide investment protections but are unable to give
such assurances because of the inherent risks associated with investing in developing countries.
By signing a BIT, governments are able to publicly affirm their commitment to international
standards and, thus, overcome their inherent structural deficiencies. Guzman, supra note 6,
at 658-59.
9 Elkins et al., supra note 15, at 278.
o See Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that "most developing country
governments do not have the legal systems and institutional structures in place to adequately
enforce laws"). Interestingly, however, at least one empirical study has shown that "developing
countries that have signed a BIT tend to be richer, larger, and more democratic" than developing
countries that have not signed any BITs. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic
Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'LREV. L. & EcON. 107, 114
(2005).
61 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and
Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 192 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. 2002)
(discussing the impact of international institutions and regimes on domestic behavior and
international cooperation); Elkins et al., supra note 15, at 277 ("BITs give host governments a
competitive edge in attracting capital if doubts otherwise exist about their willingness to enforce
contracts fairly.").
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with economic difficulties, have come to realize that one of the best ways in
which their economies can be developed is by encouraging foreign investments,
and that the bilateral investment treaty is a fine instrument to achieve that
objective."62 While facially appealing, this explanation has four principal flaws.
First, if a critical mass of developing States were willing to bind themselves to
international investment law-as is reflected by the number of developing States
that have entered into investment treaties-it makes little sense to reject an
overarching paradigm in favor of bilateral relationships. By coming together,
developing States could have acted as a unified negotiating block, thereby
reducing the costs associated with negotiating individual treaties and maximizing
their collective bargaining power. In addition, the adoption of an overarching
paradigm governing international investment law would have provided
developing States with the largest pool of potential investors because of the
multilateral nature of the resulting investment treaty.
Second, a critical aspect of the positive correlation theory is the belief that
developing States are able to realistically calculate the costs and benefits of
entering into an investment treaty. That belief necessarily assumes that
developing States fully understood the scope of obligations they were assuming.
Many developing States, however, were unaware of the obligations they were
undertaking. For example, Makhdoom Ali Khan, the Attorney General of
Pakistan, commented in 2006 that Pakistan entered into dozens of BITs because
they presented "photo-op[portunities]."63 At the time, the treaties were "signed
without any knowledge of their implications."M Consequently, the "full import
[of Pakistan's substantive obligations] became clear only after foreign investors
began to invoke the treaty rights in the course of initiating investor-State
arbitrations against Pakistan."65 According to Mr. Ali Khan, "when you are hit
by the first investor-State arbitration you realize what these words mean."'6
Third, questions exist regarding the extent to which BITs truly increase (or
are perceived to increase) the costs of making commitments. While BTs define
a government's obligations toward a foreign investor,67 an investor's willingness
to enforce those obligations depends upon a number of factors. For example, if
62 Gennady Pilch, The Development and Expansion ofBilateralInvestment Treaties, 86 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 532, 546 (1992) (comments of Asoka de Z. Gunawardana).
63 Luke Eric Peterson, Pakistan Attorney General Advises States to Scrutinize Investment





67 Elkins et al., supra note 15, at 278.
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an investment is impaired, but not destroyed, a foreign investor must balance the
possibility of recouping its past losses against the potential revenues it might
forego if it can no longer do business in the host State. Hence, a number of
investors who initiated arbitration against Argentina for losses incurred during
the 2000-2001 economic crisis withdrew their claims in exchange for an
opportunity to renegotiate the terms of their concessions.68 Other companies
elected not to initiate arbitration out of concern for the potential adverse effect
that the arbitration would have on their future business opportunities in
Argentina. Such decisions are made every day by investors around the world.
Similarly, while some have argued that the presence of the investor's home
government as a party to a BIT helps ensure the host government's compliance
by raising the cost of a breach,69 the process for resolving investment disputes
was designed to remove the home State from the equation. Private investors
were given a direct right of action against host governments largely to
depoliticize the dispute resolution process. By granting investors a private right
of action against governments, BITs were intended to remove the home
government from the enforcement equation.7" Thus, it would appear that the
home country's presence in the equation is, at most, a neutral factor.7'
Fourth, there is limited evidence showing a direct correlation between
signing a BIT and increased foreign investment. Indeed, "[tihe most
sophisticated analyses to date have found that BITs have had little effect on
increasing FDI.' '72 For example, a 1998 United Nations study found only a
marginal positive relationship between signing a BIT and increased foreign
direct investment.73 Almost a decade later, a leading study determined that
68 Damon Vis-Dunbar, France Tdl6com Latest Foreign Firm to Waive Claim Against
Argentina, INV. TREATYNEWS, May 16,2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mayl6_2006.
pdf; Luke Eric Peterson, Argentina in Settlement Talks over Several BIT Arbitrations, INV.
TREATY NEwS, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itnfeb I 72006.pdf.
69 Elkins et al., supra note 15, at 278.
71 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 27(1), openedfor signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 127, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter Washington Convention] ("No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection,
or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another
Contracting State have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this
Convention ... ").
71 One area where home-government pressure may play an important role is in cases where
a host government refuses to pay an arbitration award. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Argentina's refusal to pay adverse awards stemming from its 2000-2001
economic crisis.
72 Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 117.
73 U.N. CoNF. ON TRADE AND DEV. [UNCTAD], BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE
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although "the presence of a U.S. BIT has a large, positive, and significant
association with a country's overall FDI inflows," the presence of BITs from
other developed States had a very weak positive effect on the level of FDI.74
Factors such as a country's rate of economic growth, population, inflation levels,
and market size, and adherence to the rule of law each had statistically more
significant effects on FDI inflows.75
By contrast, Brazil, which has not ratified any bilateral or multilateral
investment treaties, has seen FDI inflows steadily increase from $1.9 billion in
1980" to approximately $45 billion in 2008."7 Similarly, U.S. investment in
China has increased dramatically over that same period, despite the fact that the
United States and China have not signed a BIT. While arguments can be made
that Brazil and China are poor examples because of their size and abundant
resources, it is precisely those and other factors that demonstrate the complexity
of the investment decision.
B. Developing States were Compelled to Enter into BITs
International investment law is predicated on a tripartite system of consent:
(1) States must consent to be bound by the substantive obligations of the system;
(2) States must consent to allow investor-State disputes to be resolved by
arbitration; and (3) investors must consent to submit disputes to international
arbitration. Some have argued, however, that the first two prongs of this system
are not truly consensual and that many developing States were in fact coerced
into signing BITs.
The coercion argument takes two forms. First, developed States have used
BITs as a point of leverage for extracting political, economic, military, or other
forms of cooperation from developing States. An example in support of this
argument is the BIT negotiations between the United States and Pakistan.
Although the United States publicly stated that "Pakistan's 150 million
people.., offer a large and potentially valuable market for U.S. exporters and
MID-1990s, at 122, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998).
7 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 105.
7 Id. at 99; see also Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 22 (noting importance of
economic growth, population, and market size to determining FDI).
76 FDI statistics for Brazil may be accessed from the UNCTAD Website by visiting the
following web address, clicking on the "FDI Country Profiles" dropdown box, and selecting
Brazil, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=3198&lang--l.
" Andre Soliani & luri Dantas, Brazil's Foreign Direct Investment Surged in December,
BLOOMBERGNEWS, Jan. 26,2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=a
q5VZCR2S2MY&refer=news.
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investors, 'T the United States' dominant motivation in entering into a BIT with
Pakistan appears to have been Pakistan's continued support in "combating global
terrorism."" It is clear, therefore, that factors other than a desire to stimulate and
protect bilateral investment can drive a developed State's decision to enter into
a BIT.
Although developed and developing States may have unequal bargaining
power in BIT negotiations, and developed States have almost certainly used
BITs as a diplomatic or political carrot, it cannot fairly be said that international
investment law is not based on the consent of the parties. Many developing
States have actively sought, and continue to seek, bilateral investment
relationships in an effort to stimulate foreign direct investment. While a
disparity in relative bargaining power may leave developing States at a
disadvantage in their ability to negotiate away from the model BITs used by
many developed States, their willingness to enter into bilateral relationships can
hardly be questioned. Moreover, the coercion argument fails to account for the
significant (and growing) number of BITs between developing States. If
developing States were truly coerced into signing BITs with developed States,
it is unclear why they would voluntarily seek out such treaties with other
developing States-particularly in light of the public concerns regarding the
international investment law system that a number of developing States have
raised. The relatively equal bargaining power among developing States severely
reduces the likelihood that one party would have the political, diplomatic, or
economic clout to coerce another into signing a BIT.
The second form of the coercion argument is effectively a "race-to-the-
bottom" theory. It posits that once one developing State enters into a BIT, others
ware required to follow suit so as not to be placed at a comparative disadvantage
in the competition for foreign capital. Interestingly, the "race" theory creates the
prospect for a two-tiered "bottom." At first, investment protections would
plateau at the levels established by the relevant BITs. As the number of
developing States that sign BITs increases, however, the comparative advantage
obtained by signing any one BIT diminishes. Because foreign investors often
view potential host States as interchangeable, developing countries would feel
pressure to provide incentives beyond those contained in the investment
treaties."0 The capital that developing States can trade to attract investment is
78 Press Release, Office ofthe U.S. Trade Rep., Pakistan, United States to Negotiate Bilateral
Investment Treaty (Sept. 28, 2004), available at http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/
2004/September/20040928184505ndyblehsO.2881433.html.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth:
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limited, often involving access to raw materials and labor, and promises
regarding the stability of the regulatory or tax environments. Thus, the
incentives that developing States may be pressured to provide can be at odds
with the long-term development goals associated with foreign investment
because they either reduce the economic value of the investment to the host State
or impose significantly greater regulatory constraints on the host government.
IV. DISCERNING WHY STATES COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
The consensual nature of international investment law means that States must
affirmatively elect to participate in the system. It also means that States may
affirmatively elect to withdraw from the system.8 It is important, therefore, to
discern what factors influence a State's decision to comply with, breach, or
withdraw from the system.
Existing compliance theories attempt to explain why States adhere to
international law generally and, as such, are focused on compliance and
enforcement at the State-to-State level. Within that context, the theories show
that, to a greater or lesser degree, States balance factors such as their self-
interest, 82 the prospect of enforcement, 83 the potential reputational and collateral
Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REv. 161, 169 (2003)
(positing that offering substantial corporate tax incentives will increase FDI into developing
countries); Avi Nov, The "Bidding War" to Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Needfor a
Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REv. 835, 835 (2006) (claiming that, in the tax context, "an
'incentive competition' or 'bidding war' between countries takes place" in an attempt to induce
FDI).
s While states would continue to be bound by customary international law norms governing
foreign investment, such norms do not provide investors with a private right of action against
a host government.
82 See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 136-45 (3d ed. 2002) (questioning
the force of international law); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE 19-22 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing international regime change); Susan
Strange, Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 337
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (asking whether the concept of regimes is helpful, or even
harmful, to students of international politics); ROBERTO. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER
AND INTERDEPENDENCE 33-52 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing international regime change), in
INTERNATIONALREGIMES; Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation 'sDilemma: The Functions
of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985) (arguing that international
trade law helps nations to resolve the dilemma of short-term benefit versus long-term conflict
with national interest); Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L OR. 485, 487 (1988) (arguing that
"neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy"); Duncan
Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners'Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation
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affects of a breach,' and the costs or benefits of compliance when deciding a
particular course of conduct.
States must make a similar calculation when deciding whether to comply
with international investment law. The variables in the equation are slightly
different, however, because of international investment law's unique aspects:
and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 923 (1985) (proposing a coordinative model of
international cooperation); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the
Resemblance Between Modem and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L
L. 639, 641 (2000) (describing the positivist account of customary international law as
something obeyed by States even, on occasion, when breaching would be in their interest).
" For example, in 2005 Professor Oona Hathaway presented an "integrated theory" of
compliance, which posits that individual compliance decisions are influenced by two factors:
legal enforcement and collateral consequences. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and
Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Cm. L. REv. 469, 473 (2005).
4 See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L.
REv. 1823, 1825 (2002) ("This Article ... puts forward a theory of international law in which
compliance comes about in a model of rational, self-interested States. International law can
affect State behavior because states are concerned about the reputational and direct sanctions that
follow its violation."); see also Hathaway, supra note 83, at 473 (emphasizing the effect of legal
enforcement and collateral consequences).
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These variables fundamentally alter the costs and benefits of the system and
force States to apply a different calculus when determining whether to accept
and ultimately comply with international investment law.
A. Legal Liability
International investment law permits investors to bring claims directly against
States. As such, a breach of international investment law carries with it the
prospect of significant financial liability. A recent study shows that, as of 2006,
the amount of quantified damages claimed in investment treaty arbitrations
ranged from $155,314 to $9.4 billion, with an average claim of approximately
$345 million. 5 The same study, however, shows that successful claimants are
often awarded substantially less than their claimed damages, with the average
award totaling $10.4 million. 6
The prospect of such liability-be it either the claimed amount or the
awarded amount-can be daunting, particularly to developing States. The affect
that such liability can have on States and the international arbitral process is
reflected in two examples. First, Argentina is a respondent in over forty cases
stemming from its response to the country's 2000-2001 economic crisis.8 7 To
date, nine awards on the merits, totaling over $1 billion in damages, have been
issued against Argentina. 8 Arbitrations against Argentina have also produced
85 Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating ClaimsAboutInvestment TreatyArbitration, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (2007) (citing claimed damages from Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/7 (decision of Jan. 25, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Inv. L.J. 1, 35, 97 (2001) and
Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9 (award of Sept. 16, 2003),
reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 404 (2005)).
16 Id. at 58.
87 For a list of pending cases against Argentina see International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes [ICSID], List of Pending Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front
Servlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending [hereinafter ICSID, List of
Pending Cases] (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
88 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (award of
May 12, 2005), reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) (awarding $133.2 million to CMS Gas
Transmission Co.); Continental Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (award of
Sept. 5, 2008) (awarding $2.8 million to Continental Cas. Co.), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/ BG-award_000.pdf; Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3 (award of May 22, 2007) (awarding $106.2 million to Enron), available at http://italaw.
uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1 (award of July 25, 2007) (awarding $57.4 million to LG7E), available at http://icsid.wor
ldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC786_En
&caseld=C208; National Grid PLC. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL Case No. 1:09-cv-00248-RBW
(award of Nov. 3, 2008) (award $53.5 million to National Grid PLC.), available at http://its.law.
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some of the largest awards ever issued in an investment dispute, including the
$132.3 million award to CMS Gas Transmission Company 9 and the $165
million award in favor of Azurix Corporation."
Argentina, however, has refused to pay any of these awards. Indeed, CMS
Gas Transmission Company, one of the first investors to obtain a ruling against
Argentina, transferred its award of $133.2 million to a subsidiary of Bank of
America that specializes in collecting distressed debt.9
Second, in Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan
Listruik Negara92 and Patuha Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik
Negara,93 foreign investors entered into agreements with Indonesia to construct
power plants and to sell the power generated by those plants back to the
government. Although the investment was not protected by a BIT or other
treaty, Indonesia contractually assumed international investment law's
substantive obligations and provided the investors the right to submit investment
disputes to international arbitration. A dispute arose and the government refused
to purchase power as required by the agreement. The claimants submitted their
disputes to arbitration, seeking billions of dollars in damages for both wasted
costs and lost profits. Although the arbitral tribunals ultimately determined that
Indonesia was liable, they awarded the claimants only 10% of their claimed lost
profits on the grounds that awarding the full amount would constitute an "abuse
of right."9' The Himpurna tribunal noted that the claimants' damages must be
curtailed so as "to prevent the claimant's undoubtedly legitimate rights from
uvic.ca/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16 (award of Sept. 28, 2007) (awarding $128.2 million to Sempra Energy Int'l), available
athttp://icsid.worldbank.lorg/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVa=showDoc&
docld=DC694_En&caseld=C8; Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (award of
Feb. 6, 2007) (awarding $237.8 million to Siemens A.G.), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/doc
umtnes/Siemens/Siemens-Argentina-Award.pdf.
89 CMS Gas Transmission Co., 44 I.L.M. at 1205.
90 Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 442.
9' Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait
for a Payout, Am. Law. -Focus EUROPE, June 25, 2009, http://www.law.com/j splaw/intematio
nal/LawArticlelntl.jsp?id= 1202431736731.
92 Himpuma Cal. Energy Ltd. v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Berm.-Indon.)
(final reward of May 4, 1999), reprinted in 25 Y.B. Com. Arb. 13 (2000).
93 Patuha Power Ltd. v. P.T. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Berm.-Indon.) (Final
award of Dec. 1999), reprinted in 14 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. B-1 (Dec. 1999).
" Himpurna, 25 Y.B. Com. Arb. at 93; Patuha, 14 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. at B-42
para. 435.
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being extended beyond tolerable norms,"95 and failure to do so would impose on
Indonesia "ever-increasing losses" that "would be ruinous to the respondent."96
The tribunals' reliance on the "abuse of right" doctrine met with significant
controversy.97 What is notable, however, for purposes of this analysis is that the
tribunal explicitly recognized the fact that the legal liability attendant to
international investment law has the potential to have a ruinous effect on host
governments.98
B. Scope of Obligations
States must understand the scope of their obligations to determine the relative
costs and benefits of compliance in any given case. This understanding comes
from the fair and uniform application of clearly defined standards. A culture of
compliance cannot emerge unless States see and believe that the law has been
applied neutrally and consistently.
Investment treaties are constitutive in nature and, as such, generally use broad
terms when describing the host government's obligation. For example, virtually
all investment treaties prohibit uncompensated expropriations and require
governments to treat foreign investments "fair[ly] and equitab[ly]." ' Most
treaties require that governments provide investors "fair and equitable treatment"
and "full protection and security."'00 In many respects, the use of such broad
language is beneficial because it allows for greater flexibility.'' From the
" Himpurna, 25 Y.B. Com. Arb. at 93.
96 Id. at 90.
9' A full discussion of this doctrine is not within the scope of this Article. For more
information, see Irina Petrova, "Stepping on the Shoulders of a Drowning Man" The Doctrine
ofAbuse ofRight as a Toolfor Reducing Damagesfor Lost Profits: Troubling Lessonsfrom the
Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 455, 463-69 (2004); Louis T. Wells,
Double Dipping in Arbitration A wards? An Economist Questions Damages A warded to Karaha
Bodas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT'L 471 (2003) (providing economic argument that
another arbitral award was excessive).
98 Patuha, 14 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. at B-42.
9 See, e.g., Model BIT, supra note 54, art. 5.
100 Id.
"'1 See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/I (decision on
liability, Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Inv. L.J. 203, 234, 123 (2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC627_En&caseld=C208. The decision notes that the fair and equitable standard was
initially articulated in the 1920s and required that "state conduct be deemed outrageous,
wrongful, open injustice, an atrocity, bad faith or voluntary negligence of duty for a violation to
be found." Id. 123 n.29. However, "[t]hat interpretation is not the same that is given today.
What was considered an 'atrocity' in 1926 might not be so today, and what may be considered
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perspective of certainty, however, generalized obligations of this type offer
States little comfort.
Where constitutive documents do not provide clear standards, clarity must
come from arbitral orjudicial bodies charged with interpreting those documents.
In the United States, for example, the courts are charged with interpreting the
Constitution and statutes, many of which are as broadly worded as investment
treaties. In the international investment context, arbitral tribunals should provide
the same clarity with respect to the obligations set forth in investment
agreements. Some critics, however, have questioned whether the arbitral system
has provided the necessary certainty.
The criticism stems, at least in part, from two factors. First, the modern
system of international investment law is relatively young. The first BIT was
signed in 1959 and the majority of arbitral decisions have been issued in the past
ten years. As such, the substantive norms are still being developed.
Second, there is no stare decisis within the investment arbitration system.
Although the public nature of International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) awards has led to a greater reliance on prior awards by parties
and arbitrators alike, tribunals need not follow those awards and are free to
decide each case on its own merits. For example, over forty arbitrations have
been brought against Argentina stemming from the passage of certain laws in
2000 and 2001. Each of those cases involved the same time period, facts, and
allegations. In defense of these cases, Argentina has consistently argued that its
actions should be excused as a matter of "necessity" under international law
because of the economic crisis it faced at that time. To date, five tribunals have
ruled on the merits of Argentina's necessity defense. Four of the five tribunals
rejected the defense and held Argentina fully liable notwithstanding the
occurrence of the economic crisis.1" One tribunal, however, accepted the
'violent' now, may not have been at that time." Id.
'02 See BG Group PLC. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL Case No. 08-0485 (final award of Dec.
24,2007) (awarding $185.2 million to BG Group PLC.), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docu
ments/BG-award_00.pdf; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8
(award of May 12,2005), reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) (awarding $133.2 million to CMS
Gas Transmission Co.); Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3 (award of May 22,2007) (awarding $106.2 million to Enron), available at http://ita.
law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
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argument and excused Argentina from liability during the peak months of the
financial crisis.'
The uncertainty created by the lack of precedent in international arbitration
affects both investors and States alike. Such uncertainty increases the difficulty
in counseling investors on their international treaty rights and predicting how
arbitral tribunals will rule on particular issues. From the State perspective, the
uncertainty makes it difficult for governments to know what regulatory measures
are permissible under international investment law. To offset the risks inherent
in this uncertainty, some countries have elected to limit their consent to
international arbitration. For example, the Philippines and Japan omitted a
provision allowing investors to submit investment disputes to arbitration from
their 2003 Economic Partnership Agreement.1" Similarly, while the Russia-
Venezuela bilateral investment agreement (which was ratified by the Russian
Federation in September 2009) permits investors to submit disputes to
arbitration, it limits their choice of forum. 5 Although both countries are
signatories to the ICSID Convention, the treaty omits ICSID as a forum to which
disputes could be submitted. Instead, investors may submit disputes to courts in
the host State, ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, or arbitration
pursuant to the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules." 6
Some countries have tried to reduce the uncertainty by minimizing
ambiguities within their investment treaties. For example, the United States'
BITs are based on model agreement that was first drafted in 1982. '07 At the
time, it provided broad investor protections that were intended to reflect both
U.S. and international law standards.1 8 In 2004, the United States substantially
revised its model Bilateral Investment Treaty. In so doing, it precisely defined
and, in some cases, narrowed the substantive protections accorded to investors. "
'03 See LG&E, 21 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Inv. L.J. at 267-68, 267 (dismissing claim because
"Argentina was in a state of necessity").
4 Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic
Partnership, Japan-Phil., Sept. 9,2006, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/phi
lippine/epa0609/main.pdf. But see Agreement on Free Trade & Economic Partnership Between
Japan & the Swiss Confederation, Japan-Switz., Feb. 19,2009, available at http://www.mofa.go.
jp/region/europe/switzerland/epa0902/agreement.pdf(providing for investor-State arbitration).
"05 Acuerdo Entre el Gobierno de la Republica Bolivarnia de Venequela y el Gobierno de la
Federacion de Rusia Sobre Ia Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones, 369 GACETA
OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA 439, 440, art. 9(2) (June 2, 2009).
106 Id.
107 Model BIT, supra note 54.
100 Sean D. Murphy, Proposed New U.S. "Model" Bilateral Investment Treaty, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 836, 836 (2004).
"o See Model BIT, supra note 54. For a critique of the new model BIT, see Stephen M.
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These revisions were made in an effort to create more certainty and
predictability in how tribunals would interpret and enforce U.S. BITs and have
been incorporated in subsequent BITs and Free Trade Agreements signed by the
United States.
In 2008, Norway proposed a new model BIT that would have resulted in
several major substantive changes.1"0 In particular, the new BIT would have
included an exhaustion-of-local-remedies requirement and would have narrowed
the definition of "investor" so as to limit the ability of so-called "mailbox"
companies from using the treaty's protections."' Notably, the proposed BIT also
emphasized the importance of corporate social responsibility, human rights, and
sustainable development, and as such, sought to impose basic duties on investors
as a precondition to obtaining protections under the treaty."' In June 2009,
Norway abandoned its efforts to adopt the proposed model BIT after receiving
considerable resistance from a number of nongovernmental organizations and
business groups, who claimed that the proposed model both failed to provide
enough substantive protections to investors and unduly restrained the
government's ability to regulate in the public interest."3 According to one
government official, the prospect of "achieving a proper balance was too
difficult" to justify moving forward with the proposed model." 4 As a result,
Norway has questioned whether it will enter into future BITS. For the moment,
Norway has indicated that it would consider including investment provisions in
the context of a free trade agreement."| 5 Thus, Norway's dissatisfaction with the
current BIT system and its inability to create increased certainty has called into
question the country's future participation in the system.
Still other countries have tried to eliminate the uncertainty altogether by
moving away from the international investment law system. For example, the
Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean was created in 2006
Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the
Regressive Development of International Law, TRANSNAT'T Disp. MGT., Apr. 2006, at I
(critiquing the 2004 Model BIT).
110 Luke Eric Peterson, Norway Proposes Significant Reforms to Its Investment Treaty
Practice, INV. TREATYNEWS, Mar. 27,2008, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itnmar27_2008.pdf.
... Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and ----- for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments art. 15(3) (Draft Version 191207), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upl
oad/NHDNedlegg/hoeringer/Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc.
12 Id. art. 23(3)(viii).
313 Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INV.
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as a means of fostering economic integration among the countries of Latin
America. Unlike other similar organizations, the Bolivarian Alliance explicitly
rejects the notion of bilateral or regional investment treaties.' 6 The Alliance
was initially proposed by Venezuela and Cuba, but today includes ten Latin
American countries."7 As evidence of the Alliance's hostility to international
investment law, two members-Bolivia and Ecuador-have withdrawn from the
ICSID Convention," 8 and others have threatened to follow suit.
While the actions of countries that have moved away from the international
investment law system have resulted in substantial debate within the legal and
academic community, they remain outliers within the system as a whole.
Nevertheless, while the utility and impact of each country's response can be
debated, it is clear that a need for greater certainty exists and that the desire for
such certainty is a driving force behind the actions of many countries. It is also
clear that greater certainty is essential for the system's long-term growth and
legitimacy.
C. Domestic Expectations/Demands
States must balance their international obligations against the needs and
demands of various domestic constituencies. Achieving that balance within the
context of international investment law can be difficult. International
investment law creates a two-tiered system of protections that intentionally
advantages foreign investment over domestic investment. Although
international investment law does not replace the host country's entire domestic
regime, it does provide foreign investments a higher standard of property rights
protections than are typically available to domestic investors. In many cases,
this disparity is meaningless because foreign investment exists in sectors where
there is little or no domestic competition. In some cases, however, domestic and
foreign investments coexist and the increased protections available to foreign
investments could create resentment by domestic investors.
H6 Fernando Pelez-Pier & Yulena Sinchez-Hoet, Venezuela, in THE ARBITRATION REvIEW
OF THE AMERICAS (2008), available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/4/secti
ons/8/chapters/49/venezuela/.
"7 See id.; see also Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Ecuador to Officially
Join the ALBA Agreement (June 3,2009), http://www.cubaminrex.cu/English/ALBA/Articulos/
Press/2009/Ecuador.html; ACN Newswire, Two More Caribbean Countries Join ALBA Bloc,
CARIBBEANNETNEWS, June 23,2009, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/news- 17249--1 2-12--
.html.
",8 See infra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, foreign investment and international investment law are often
closely intertwined with politically sensitive issues of State sovereignty. Foreign
investment in many States-particularly developing States-is directed
principally at infrastructure and natural resources-two sectors that are
embedded with nationalistic sentiment and perceptions of sovereign authority.
Developing States, therefore, must balance the need for foreign investment in
those sectors against the perception that foreign investors may exploit their
dependence on such investment.
The necessary balance is not always easily achieved. Even when it is, the
balance can shift over time as governments and public sentiment change. Recent
events in Bolivia and Ecuador illustrate the tensions that can exist between a
State's international obligations and domestic demands.
1. Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, with an economy
that is principally tied to its natural resources." 9 Due to its poverty and lack of
industry, Bolivia has long needed foreign investment to benefit from those
resources.
In the early 2000s, Bolivia underwent a political shift that saw an increase in
nationalistic sentiment and a push for increased sovereign control over the
country's natural resources. In 2005, Evo Morales was elected President of
Bolivia and undertook to regain control over privatized natural resources. 12
Within the first 100 days of his term, President Morales moved to nationalize the
nation's oil and gas sector, transferring majority control in the industry to the
State oil company, Yacimentos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos. 12 1 At the time,
Bolivia was a party to BITs with Argentina and Spain, both of which had
investors who were adversely affected by Bolivia's actions.'
19 Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Bolivian Voters Approve New Constitution as the Government




121 See, e.g., Paulo Prada, Bolivian Nationalizes the Oil and Gas Sector, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2006, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/02/world/americas/02bol
ivia.html (stating that Morales ordered private foreign producers to forfeit control of oil fields,
providing 180 days to renegotiate contracts). At the time, Bolivia was party to nineteen BITs.
A full list of the BITs to which Bolivia is a party can be found at U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev.
[UNCTAD], Total Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded, 1 June 2009, http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docts/bitsbolivia.pdf.
122 Prada, supra note 121; see also U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Econ., Energy and Bus.
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Bolivia has been named as a respondent in three investor-State arbitrations
brought to ICSID. Based largely on that experience and a concern over the
perceived disadvantages faced by developing States in investment arbitrations,
Bolivia notified ICSID in May 2000 that it would withdraw from the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States 123 effective November 3, 2007.124 At the time of its notification, two cases
against Bolivia were pending before ICSID tribunals. 125
Membership in the Washington Convention is a precondition to accessing the
ICSID arbitral process. By withdrawing from the Washington Convention,
Bolivia has removed the prospect of ICSID arbitration as a means of resolving
investment disputes with future investment partners. 126 At the same time that
Bolivia denounced the Washington Convention, it announced a systematic
process of renegotiating concession and foreign investment agreements with the
goal of restoring the purported economic equilibrium of the agreements and
creating terms more favorable to Bolivia.
Finally, in January 2009, Bolivia ratified a new constitution that, among other
things, subjected foreign investors to Bolivian sovereignty, Bolivian law, and
Bolivian authorities with respect to any activity carried out in the hydrocarbons
sector. 27 As such, all disputes in that sector shall be resolved exclusively by the
Affairs, 2009 Investment Climate Statement-Bolivia, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/
2009/117852.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) (noting that Bolivia has signed BITs with
Argentina, Spain and twelve other nations).
123 Washington Convention, supra note 70.
124 Damon Vis-Dunbar et al., Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID,
Pursues BIT Revisions, INV. TREATY NEWS, May 9, 2007, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_m
ay9_2007.pdf.
125 ICSID, List of Pending Cases, supra note 87; E.T.I. Euro Telecom Int'l B.V. v. Bolivia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/28 (proceeding discounted as of Oct. 21, 2009); Quimica e Industrial
del B6rax Ltda. et al. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2.
126 Bolivia's withdrawal from the Washington Convention does not vitiate its consent to
ICSID jurisdiction for investment disputes submitted to ICSID prior to the date of withdrawal.
Similarly, strong arguments can be made that Bolivia's withdrawal does not affect the consent
to ICSID jurisdiction contained in any of Bolivia's existing BITs. Article 72 of the Washington
Convention provides that withdrawal from the Washington Convention "shall not affect the
rights or obligations under this Convention [of the withdrawing State] arising out of consent to
the jurisdiction of the Centre given .. . before such notice was received by the depositary."
Washington Convention, supra note 70. An arbitral tribunal has clearly held that a state's
consent to ICSID jurisdiction is found in the language of a BIT permitting an investor to submit
disputes for resolution to the Centre and becomes irrevocable at the time the BIT is ratified.
Lanco Int'l Inc. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6 (Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction
of Dec. 8, 1998), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001).
127 Constituci6n de 2009 arts. 351, 359-68 (Bol.), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
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Bolivian courts.'28  Foreign investors are prohibited from submitting such
disputes to international arbitration and from seeking the diplomatic protection
of their home governments.'29 Moreover, foreign arbitral awards involving
Bolivia's hydrocarbon sector will no longer be recognized or enforced, and
existing foreign arbitration awards may be annulled by the Bolivian courts.
2. Ecuador
Over the past two years, Ecuador has incrementally withdrawn its consent to
the international investment law system. In December 2007, Ecuador notified
the ICSID Secretariat that, pursuant to Article 25(4) of the Washington
Convention, it no longer consented to ICSID's jurisdiction over disputes
regarding oil, mining, and other natural resources. 3 ' Then, in October 2008,
Ecuador notified the governments of Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay that it was
denouncing the BITs it had signed with each country.' Ecuador's reason for
terminating the treaty relationships was that Ecuador had reviewed "its domestic
as well as international policies in the matter of investments," evaluated "the
impact of the BITs on the national economy," and concluded that those treaties
have "not reached [their] fundamental objective, that is, to motivate the
attraction of capitals."' 32
Finally, on July 6, 2009, Ecuador formally notified ICSID that it was
withdrawing from the ICSID system effective January 7, 2010.133 At the time,
Ecuador was a named respondent in six ICSID cases and is facing billions of
Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html.
128 Id. art. 366.
129 Id.
13o See News Release, Int'l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Ecuador's Notification
Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 5,2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&ActionVal-OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame
&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement9 (clicking link "here" provides
notification document in Spanish).
3' See Ecuador Terminates BITs with Eight Lat-Am States, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Nov. 5,2008.
132 MAHNEZ MALIK, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 9 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2008/dci recent dev bits.pdf(quoting Official RegisterNo. 452, Oct.23,2008 (Equador)).
113 News Release, Int'l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under
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dollars in potential liability.13 4 Ecuador's president announced that its actions
were necessary to further "the liberation" of Ecuador because ICSID "signifies
colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals, with respect to Washington,
with respect to the World Bank and we cannot tolerate this.' '135 Ecuador has a
long record of questioning ICSID's impartiality and objecting to what it
perceives as unfairness in the international investment law system.
136
3. Reputation/Investment Climate
A State's reputation exists at both the investment and systemic levels. At the
investment level, countries seeking foreign investment attempt to create a stable
and transparent investment environment that has the "appropriate legal,
administrative, and regulatory framework" that "modem investment theory has
come to recognize as a conditio sine qua non of the success of' private
investment. 37 The investment-level reputation, therefore, bears directly on a
State's attractiveness to potential investors.
By contrast, a State's reputation at the systemic level bears on its
attractiveness as a treaty partner to other States. The greater a State's reputation
for compliance, the greater the likelihood other States would be willing to enter
into treaties with it.'31 States that are interested in expanding their participation
in the investment treaty system, therefore, have a vested interest in taking actions
that do not undermine their commitment to the system.
State action can affect its reputation in different ways. At the investment
level, directed action against a single or small number of investors will be
perceived differently than acts that cut across entire industries. While
potentially giving rise to legal liability, such directed actions do not necessarily
call into question the State's commitment to the international investment law
114 ICSID, List of Pending Cases, supra note 87. In total, Ecuador has been named as a
respondent in thirteen ICSID arbitrations since 2001.




137 Reisman & Sloan, supra note 28, at 117.
13 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Design ofInternationalAgreements, 16 EuR. J. INT'L
L. 579, 596 (2005) ("A state that violates an international commitment signals... that it does
not take its international promises seriously and.., is willing to ignore its obligations. When
that state seeks to enter into agreements ... its potential partners will take into account the
risk... and will be less willing to offer concessions... in exchange for promises from that
country. If there is enough suspicion, potential partners may simply refuse to deal with the
state.").
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system as a whole. As in other areas of law, individual instances of breach do
not necessarily reflect a repudiation of the law per se. While directed action may
tarnish the perception of the State's investment environment or cause subsequent
investors to price investments differently-i.e., seek greater incentives or
guaranteed returns on their investment-they likely would not diminish the
State's prospects of entering into other investment treaties.
At the systemic level, a State's reputation can be harmed by actions that call
into question its commitment to the international investment law system. Such
actions can take several forms. As described above, Argentina has refused to
pay valid ICSID awards issued in favor of foreign investors. Argentina's
position is notable in that it is the first time that a government has refused to pay
an adverse award issued by an ICSID tribunal, overtly calling into question
Argentina's willingness to comply with a system that it voluntarily adopted.'39
Thus, given their wide-ranging implications, Argentina's actions necessarily
have a direct effect on its systemic reputation.
Similarly, the withdrawal from ICSID by Bolivia and Ecuador, coupled with
Ecuador's Article 25 notice and denunciation of various BITs, severely
undermine their commitment to the system. Such actions not only affect their
investment-level reputations, but also their systemic reputations and, thus, could
have an effect on the willingness of other States to enter into future treaties with
either country.
V. CONCLUSION
States must balance multiple variables when determining whether to accept,
breach, or repudiate international investment law. Recent events have shed light
on the various factors that underlie a State's decision-making process and are
useful in discerning trends. For example, the most vocal opponents of the
international investment law systen--Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia-have been
respondents in multiple investment disputes and have recently undergone
substantial internal political upheaval. Their perspective, therefore, appears to
be heavily influenced by the prospect of substantial financial liability and the
desire to appease domestic pressures by reasserting control over natural resource
and infrastructure sectors-areas that are closely tied with notions of
sovereignty and national pride. Similarly, while the United States was one of the
principal architects of the current international law system, it entered into the
139 For a discussion regarding the enforceability of ICSID awards and the affect of
Argentina's actions, see High Noon a Round Table over Unpaid ICSID Awards, GLOBAL ARB.
REv., Dec. 1, 2008.
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majority of its investment treaties at a time when there was little prospect of
substantial reciprocal investment from its treaty partners. Thus, the broad
constitutive language used in its early BITs was intended principally to protect
U.S. investors without regard to the possibility that the United States may
actually be named as a respondent in an investment dispute. Times have
changed, however, and the United States has been hailed before NAFTA
tribunals on several occasions. Although the United States has never lost an
investment dispute, it is clear that the uncertainty surrounding the scope of
international investment law's substantive obligations has caused the United
States to modify its approach to the area of law. Thus, its revised Model BIT is
intended to provide greater certainty and to more clearly limit the scope of
potential liability.
Over time, as more data becomes available, it should be possible to assess the
relative weight the above-mentioned variables play in the State decision-making
process. At the moment, however, the identification of these variables should
allow existing and potential investors to discern trends in State conduct and may
help predict how States will react to changes in their political, economic, or
social conditions.
2009]

